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What’s Wrong with Litigation-Driven Science? 
An Essay in Legal Epistemology 
Susan Haack∗
 
If Science, for a consideration, can be induced to prove anything 
which a party litigant needs in order to sustain his side of the is-
sue, then Science is fairly open to the charge of venality and per-
jury, rendered the more base by the disguise of natural truth in 
which she robes herself. 
  John Ordronaux1
I. INTRODUCTION 
 Jeremy Bentham’s memorable description of “Injustice and 
her handmaid, Falsehood”2 should remind us, if we need reminding, 
that factual truth is an important element of justice,3 that it really 
matters whether this witness’s recovered memory of an alleged crime 
is genuine, whether this is the person who committed the crime, 
whether this plaintiff’s injury was caused by a defect in this manufac-
turer’s tire or seat-belt buckle or lawn-chair, whether this was the 
 ∗ Distinguished Professor in the Humanities, Cooper Senior Scholar in Arts and 
Sciences, Professor of Philosophy and Professor of Law, University of Miami.  This 
paper was written for and first presented at the March 2006 Coronado III conference 
on Litigation-Driven Science, organized by the project on Scientific Knowledge and 
Public Policy (SKAPP).  © 2008 Susan Haack & Seton Hall Law Review. 
My thanks to Mark Migotti for detailed comments on more than one draft; to 
Robert Lane, and the participants at the Coronado III conference, for their com-
ments on the penultimate version; and to Barbara Brandon, Michelle Cosby, David 
Hollander, and Helen Wohl, of the University of Miami Law Library, for research 
assistance. 
 1 John Ordronaux, On Expert Testimony in Judicial Proceedings, 30 AM. J. INSANITY 
312, 312 (1874). 
 2 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 22 (Garland Publishing 
Inc. 1978) (1827). 
 3 An important element of substantive justice, that is—with which considerations 
of procedural justice in some instances compete: e.g., when a person who committed 
a crime goes unpunished, or a person who suffered an injury goes uncompensated, 
for lack of admissible evidence making the case to the required degree of proof. 
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chemical exposure that caused or promoted the plaintiff’s cancer, 
and so on.4
Because the factual truths at issue in a case often go beyond what 
the average juror can be expected to know, courts have come increas-
ingly to rely on expert witnesses, among them scientists testifying on 
just about every subject imaginable: experts on blood, bullets, bite-
marks, battered wives; on PCBs, paternity, poisons, post-traumatic 
stress; on radon, recovered memories, rape trauma syndrome, ran-
dom-match probabilities; on psychosis, asbestosis, silicosis (and for all 
I know, on psittacosis!).  But as long as courts have relied significantly 
on scientific witnesses, there have been complaints: about the scien-
tific ignorance and gullibility of attorneys, judges, and jurors; about 
“witness-shopping”; and—as my opening quotation illustrates—about 
the irresponsibility and venality of professional scientific experts will-
ing to say whatever is needed to advance the cause of the party that 
hires them. 
As reliance on expert witnesses has grown, so has the felt need 
for courts to ensure that the expert testimony admitted is not just 
flimsy or interested speculation, but reliable enough to be more help-
ful than misleading; and one factor that courts have sometimes taken 
as indicating that proffered scientific testimony may not be reliable is 
that it is based on “litigation-driven” science.  As it happens, the con-
text in which I first encountered criticisms of proffered scientific tes-
timony as “litigation-driven” was Judge Kozinski’s 1995 ruling in 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., on remand from the Su-
preme Court.5  As I subsequently discovered, however, that expert tes-
timony is based on litigation-driven research has been construed not 
 4 This principle has, however, sometimes been deliberately sidestepped in civil 
cases; see, e.g., Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1948), where the court held that:   
where a group of persons are on a hunting party, or otherwise engaged 
in the use of firearms, and two of them are negligent in firing in the di-
rection of a third person who is injured thereby, both of those so firing 
are liable for the injury . . . although the negligence of only one of 
them could have caused [it]. 
Id.; Sindell v. Abbott Labs, 607 P.2d 924, 937 (Cal. 1980) (holding that “[e]ach de-
fendant will be held liable for the proportion of the judgment represented by its 
share of that market unless it demonstrates that it could not have made the product 
which caused plaintiff’s injuries”); and, most strikingly, Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 
539 N.E.2d 1069, 1081 (N.Y. 1989) (holding that “there should be no exculpation for 
a defendant who, although a member of the market producing DES [diethylstilbe-
strol] for pregnancy use, appears not to have caused a particular plaintiff’s injury”). 
 5 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. (Daubert IV), 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 
1995). 
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only as bearing on its admissibility, but also as lowering its weight;6 
and has been construed as bearing on the admissibility of scientific 
testimony under Frye v. United States7 as well as under Daubert.8
This prompts a host of questions, legal and epistemological, 
theoretical and practical.  What role has this factor played in courts’ 
handling of scientific testimony?  What exactly does it mean to de-
scribe research as “litigation-driven”?  What reasons have courts given 
for regarding litigation-driven science with suspicion?  Are these rea-
sons sound?  And if they are, does this suffice to show that Judge Koz-
inski’s new “Daubert factor”—whether the science on which testimony 
is based is litigation-driven—is a useful indicator of the (un)reliability 
of proffered expert testimony? 
Part II of this Article will look in some detail at two Bendectin 
cases: Daubert itself, which I’m sure I don’t need to tell you was a fed-
eral case tried first in 1989 under Frye, but reheard by the U.S. Court 
of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit on remand from the Supreme Court 
of the United States under the new standards of admissibility the Su-
 6 See, e.g., Perry v. United States, 755 F.2d 888, 892 (1985) (“[Plaintiff’s expert 
witness] Dr. Goldfield had reached a conclusion as to the connection between en-
cephalitis and the [swine flu] vaccine before commencing his research.”).  The 
Court cited similar criticism of Dr. Goldfield’s testimony in O’Gara v. United States, 
560 F. Supp. 786, 790 (E.D. Pa. 1983), and in Robinson v. United States, 533 F. Supp. 
320, 328 (E.D. Mich. 1982). 
 7 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); see, e.g., Lofgren v. Mo-
torola, No. CV93-05521, 1988 WL 2999925, at *32 (Ariz. Super. June 1, 1988) (ex-
cluding the testimony of plaintiff’s expert witness Dr. Kilburn that the injuries were 
caused by a single exposure to Rubiflex, in part on the grounds that “the conclusion 
appeared to be more litigation-driven than science oriented”). 
 8 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. (Daubert III), 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993); 
see, e.g., Burleson v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 393 F.3d 577, 584 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(“Dr. Carlson’s ‘radiation hot-spot’ theory is nothing more than litigation-driven 
speculation, not science.”); Prohaska v. Sofamor, 138 F. Supp. 2d 422, 437 (W.D.N.Y. 
2001) (Dr. Austin’s testimony that pedicle screws manufactured by the defendant 
were defective excluded because “litigation-driven expertise has been found to be a 
negative factor in admissibility”); Downs v. Prestorp Components, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 
2d 1090, 1094, 1129 (E.D. Tenn. 1999) (excluding Dr. Kilburn’s testimony because it 
“appeared to be more litigation-driven than science oriented” and is “based upon 
nothing more than conjecture, speculation, and litigation animus”) (internal cita-
tions omitted)); Mancuso v. Consol. Edison, 967 F. Supp. 1437, 1445 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) 
(Dr. Schwartz’s testimony that PCB exposure caused Mr. Mancuso’s ailments inad-
missible because he “rel[ied] upon plaintiff’s attorney to provide him with the scien-
tific literature”); Celotex Corp. v. AIU Ins. Co., 196 B.R. 973, 984–85  (Bankr. M.D. 
Pa. 1996) (“[T]he ‘scientific’ evidence regarding asbestos . . . in buildings . . . 
[seems] more litigation driven than science driven.”); Nelson v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline 
Co., No 95-1112, 1998 WL 1297690, at *8, *13 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 31, 1998) (exclud-
ing Dr. Kilburn’s testimony partly on the grounds that his study “was performed in 
connection with litigation and funded by plaintiffs’ counsel,” and Dr. Hirsch’s partly 
on the grounds of his “failure to have . . . conducted prelitigation research”). 
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preme Court had set in 1993;9 and a less famous case, Blum v. Merrell 
Dow, from a Frye state (Pennsylvania) which began, before Daubert, in 
1982, but didn’t come to a final resolution until 2000.10  In both cases 
we find expert opinion criticized as based on “litigation-driven sci-
ence”—though in Daubert this criticism was directed at the reliability 
of the plaintiff’s experts’ testimony, while in Blum it was directed at 
the legitimacy of the “scientific consensus” to which the defendants’ 
experts appealed; and both Judge Kozinski (in Daubert) and Judge 
Bernstein (in Blum) tried to articulate why litigation-driven science is 
apt to be less dependable than independently-conducted research. 
Part III will explain the distinction between inquiry and advocacy 
and explore the differences between investigation, plain and simple, 
and advocacy research; and then clear up an ambiguity in “litigation-
driven” and some uncertainties in “reliable.”  This analysis will reveal 
that research that is litigation-driven in the stronger of the two senses 
distinguished is inherently in danger of bias; and in consequence is 
inherently less likely to be—at least in one understanding of that 
somewhat elusive concept—evidentially reliable. 
This, in turn, will suggest some conclusions, articulated in Part 
IV.  There is some truth, as both Judge Kozinski and Judge Bernstein 
argue, in the idea that the fact that science is litigation-driven indi-
cates that it is more likely to be unreliable.  But there is something 
not quite right about Judge Kozinski’s arguments for this conclusion; 
and the flaws in his arguments reveal that his new Daubert factor is 
not, after all, as helpful as he hopes, or as it might initially seem.  This 
diagnosis leads to some disturbing thoughts about how scientific work 
can be distorted and impeded when it gets entangled with litigation, 
and some hard questions about these interactions of science with the 
law. 
II. A LEGAL THICKET:  
THE TANGLED TALE OF DAUBERT AND BLUM 
In Frye v. United States, in excluding the results of a then-new 
blood-pressure lie-detector test, the D.C. Court of Appeals had ruled 
that novel scientific testimony is admissible only if the “scientific 
 9 Daubert III, 509 U.S. 579; see also Daubert IV, 43 F.3d at 1311; Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharms., Inc. (Daubert II), 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991); Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharms., Inc. (Daubert I), 727 F.Supp. 570 (S.D. Cal. 1989). 
 10 Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 1 Pa. D. & C.4th 634 (Ct. Comm. Pleas Pa. 
1988), rev’d, 560 A.2d 212 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), aff’d, 626 A.2d 537 (Pa. 1993), re-
manded to 33 Phila. Co. Rptr. 193 (Ct. Comm. Pleas Pa. 1996), rev’d, 705 A.2d 
1314 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997), aff’d, sub nom. Blum ex rel. Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 
Inc., 747 A.2d 877 (2000). 
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principle or discovery” from which it is deduced is “sufficiently estab-
lished to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in 
which it belongs.”11  For a decade, Frye wasn’t cited even once, and in 
its first quarter-century it was cited only a dozen or so times; but by 
the early 1980s it was being cited over and over, and was “probably 
the ‘majority rule’” in the country.12
The Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE), enacted in 1975, provided 
in Rule 702 that expert testimony is admissible if it is relevant and not 
legally excluded under Rule 403 on grounds of prejudice, waste of 
time, or confusing or misleading the jury.13  Because Rule 702 said 
nothing about general acceptance, it provoked debate among legal 
scholars about whether the Federal Rules had or hadn’t superseded 
Frye.  By the late 1980s, there was a burgeoning concern with reliabil-
ity.  By 1991, the publication of Peter Huber’s Galileo’s Revenge: Junk 
Science in the Courtroom was fueling fears that flimsy, interested, wildly 
speculative science was flooding the courts; the same year, some 
judges on the Federal Rules Advisory Committee sought to change 
the FRE to include a reliability requirement.  By 1992, the first Bush 
administration was urging similar changes.14  These initiatives were 
preempted, however, by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Daubert.  
* * * 
While pregnant, Mrs. Daubert had taken Bendectin for morning 
sickness (which, though often just a nuisance, may be serious enough 
to require hospitalization—and can be fatal).15  Her baby, Jason, was 
born with severe birth defects.  Coming to suspect that Bendectin was 
the cause, in 1989 the Dauberts brought suit against Merrell Dow 
 11 Frye, 293 F. at 1014. 
 12 See Paul C. Giannelli, Frye v. United States: Background Paper Prepared for the Na-
tional Conference of Lawyers and Scientists, 99 F.R.D. 189, 196 (1983). 
 13 FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 14 See Michael H. Gottesman, From Barefoot to Daubert to Joiner: Triple Play or 
Double Error?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 753, 757–59 (1998) (citing Preliminary Draft of Pro-
posed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, 137 F.R.D. 53, 73, 156 (1991) (proposal of the Civil Rules Advisory Com-
mittee); Dan Quayle, Agenda for Civil Justice Reform in America, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 997, 
999 (1992) (proposal of the President’s Competitiveness Committee)). 
 15 See, e.g., American Pregnancy Association, Morning Sickness, http://www.americ 
anpreganancy.org/preganancyhealth/morningsickness.html (last visited Aug. 9, 
2007); American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Morning Sickness, http: 
//www.acog.org/publications/patient_education/bp126.cfm (last visited Aug. 9, 
2007). 
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Pharmaceuticals, the manufacturer of the drug.16  The company had 
taken Bendectin off the market in 1983, shortly after the first reports 
appeared of children with limb defects being born to women who 
had taken the drug17—though the company maintained that the with-
drawal was not prompted by the alleged dangers, but by the potential 
costs of litigation.18  (The chemically identical drug is still on sale, by 
a different company and under a different name, in Canada.19) 
The Dauberts proffered experts to testify that their re-analyses of 
the existing data showed a statistical link between Bendectin and 
limb-reduction birth defects; that Bendectin causes birth defects in 
laboratory animals, and so probably causes them in humans too; and 
that Bendectin is chemically similar to other drugs suspected of caus-
ing such defects.20  Merrell Dow’s attorneys presented evidence that 
no clinical trial had ever been published that showed Bendectin to be 
teratogenic;21 that despite a wave of Bendectin litigation the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) had continued to approve the drug 
for use by pregnant women, because “available data do not demon-
strate an association between birth defects and Bendectin;”22 and that 
the consensus among medical scientists was that the drug was safe.23  
 16 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. (Daubert IV), 43 F.3d 1311, 1313 (9th Cir. 
1995). 
 17 Gottesman, supra note 14, at 767. 
 18 Astara March, Drug Revived to Fight Morning Sickness, NURSE WEEK, Oct. 11, 2000, 
http://www.nurseweek.com/news/00-10/1011morn.asp. 
 19 Duchesnay Inc. sells the drug under the name “Diclectin” in Canada, and is 
seeking FDA approval to sell it in the U.S.  Diclectin, http://www.diclectin.com/ 
index.html (last visited Jul. 26, 2007).  At an FDA/NIH conference held on Dec. 4, 
2000, Dr. Gideon Koren of the University of Toronto asked “How safe is safe?” and 
answered that while in the first meta-analysis, conducted in Toronto, there were 
130,000 case controls, and an odds ratio of 1.0, “there was a confidence interval go-
ing to 155, which means we cannot say for sure that there isn’t a 55 percent in-
creased risk.” Interface of Clinical Pharmacology and Drug Safety at FDA/NIH Confer-
ence, (Dec. 4, 2000), http://www.fda.gov/cder/present/clinpharm2000/1204preg. 
txt (last visited Jul. 30, 2007).  So far as I have been able to determine, as of August 
2007, Diclectin had not been approved in the U.S. 
 20 Daubert IV, 43 F.3d at 1314. 
 21 A teratogen (from the Greek word, tera, meaning “monster”) is a substance 
that causes birth defects. 
 22 U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. News, No. P80-45 (Oct. 7, 1980).  The 
ruling in Daubert IV ends the quotation here; however, it continues “[Bendectin] 
should be used only when conservative treatment fails.”  Joseph Sanders, From Science 
to Evidence: The Testimony on Causation in the Bendectin Cases, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1, 7 
(1993).  According to the FDA Orange Book Detail Record, “[Bendectin] was  
not discontinued or withdrawn for safety or efficacy reasons.”  Drugs@FDA, http:// 
www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/docs/obdetail.cfm?Appl_No=010598&TAB 
(last visited Jul. 31, 2007). 
 23 Daubert IV,  43 F.3d at 1314. 
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Before Daubert, the Frye Rule had been used almost exclusively in 
criminal cases.24  Unusually, however, in Daubert the trial court (citing 
U.S. v. Kilgus and Barrel of Fun v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.)25 had 
relied significantly on Frye in ruling the plaintiffs’ expert evidence in-
admissible.  The Dauberts’ proffered scientific testimony was not, as 
the Frye standard requires, generally accepted in the field to which it 
belongs; for, the court continues, this would require that there be sta-
tistically significant epidemiological evidence of causation,26 but 
“none of the published studies show a statistically significant associa-
tion between the use of Bendectin and birth defects.”27  So the trial 
court granted Merrell Dow summary judgment; and in 1991 (citing 
U.S. v. Solomon), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed. 28
Because of the trial court’s almost unprecedented reliance on 
Frye, the key issue as Daubert came before the Supreme Court in 1993 
was whether the Federal Rules had or hadn’t superseded the older 
rule.  Holding that they had, the Supreme Court reversed and re-
manded.  At the same time, however, the Court (re)interpreted FRE 
702 as requiring courts to screen proffered scientific testimony not 
only for relevance, as the Rule explicitly required, but also for reli-
ability; and provided a “flexible list” of indicia that might be consid-
ered in assessing whether such testimony was reliable enough to be 
 24 So when Peter Huber argued that Frye had helped keep junk science out of tort 
cases before the Federal Rules of Evidence relaxed the standards of admissibility, he 
misrepresented the relevant legal history.  See PETER HUBER, GALILEO’S REVENGE: JUNK 
SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM, 14–17, 41, 150, 176–77, 199–201, 204 (1993); Peter 
Huber, Junk Science in the Courtroom, 26 VAL. L. REV. 723 (1992); see also Kenneth J. 
Cheseboro, Galileo’s Retort: Peter Huber’s Junk Scholarship, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1637, 1687–
96 (1994). 
 25 Kilgus was a criminal case in which testimony identifying the defendant’s air-
craft using a “forward looking infrared system” had been excluded under Frye.  
United States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508, 510 (9th Cir. 1978) (“[A] necessary predicate 
to the admission of scientific evidence is that the principle on which it is based ‘must 
be sufficiently established to have general acceptance in the field to which it be-
longs.’”) (quoting United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 546 (6th Cir. 1977)).  Barrel 
of Fun was a fire-insurance fraud case in which polygraph testimony had been ex-
cluded under Frye; so far as I know, it was the only civil case before Daubert I which 
had relied on Frye.  Barrel of Fun v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 739 F.2d 1028 (5th 
Cir. 1984).   
 26 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. (Daubert I), 727 F.Supp. 570, 573 (S.D. 
Cal. 1989). 
 27 Id. at 575. 
 28 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. (Daubert II), 951 F.2d 1128, 1129–30 (9th 
Cir. 1991) (citing United States v. Solomon, 753 F.2d 1522, 1526 (9th Cir. 1985)).  
Solomon was a murder case in which the higher court affirmed the trial court’s exclu-
sion, under Frye, of evidence concerning narcoanalysis. 
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admissible: whether the proffered testimony “can be (and has been) 
tested; the known or potential error rate;” whether the evidence has 
been subject to scrutiny by way of “peer review and publication”; and 
(in a nod to Frye) whether it is generally accepted in the field to 
which it belongs.29
Rehearing the case on remand, in a memorable passage that 
would soon be much cited by judges and legal commentators,30 Judge 
Kozinski wrote of the formidable task the Supreme Court had set for 
him and his colleagues on the federal bench: 
     Federal judges ruling on the admissibility of expert scientific 
testimony face a far more complex and daunting task in a post-
Daubert world than before. . . . [T]hough we are largely un-
trained in science and certainly no match for any of the witnesses 
whose testimony we are reviewing, it is our responsibility to de-
termine whether those experts’ proposed testimony amounts to 
“scientific knowledge,” constitutes “good science,” and was de-
rived by the “scientific method.” . . . [W]e take a deep breath and 
proceed with this heady task.31
The Daubert Court, he noted, had not supplied a “definitive checklist” 
of indicia of reliability, only an illustrative list of the factors to which 
courts might look;32 but this list raised some tricky questions: 
[H]ow do we determine whether the rate of error is acceptable, 
and by what standard? . . . [W]hat should we infer from the fact 
that the methodology has been tested, but only by the party’s own 
expert . . . ?  Do we ask whether the methodology they employ to 
test their methodology is itself methodologically sound? . . . [T]he 
 29 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. (Daubert III), 509 U.S. 579, 593–94 
(1993). 
 30 See, e.g., Sofia Adrogue, The Post-Daubert Court: “Amateur Scientist” Gatekeeper or 
Executioner?, 35 HOUS. L. REV., 10, 10 (1998); Mark S. Brodin, Behavioral Science Evi-
dence in the Age of Daubert: Reflections of a Skeptic, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 862, 867 (2005); 
Judge Harvey Brown, Eight Gates for Expert Witnesses, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 743, 784 (1999); 
Lee Epstein & Gary King, Empirical Research and the Goals of Legal Scholarship: The Rules 
of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 133 (2002); David L. Faigman, The Law’s Scientific 
Revolution: Reflections and Ruminations on the Law’s Use of Experts in Year Seven of the 
Revolution, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 661, 684 (2000); G. Michael Fenner, The Daubert 
Handbook: The Case, Its Essential Dilemma, and Its Progeny, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 939, 
1066–67 (1996); Robert J. Goodwin, The Hidden Significance of Kumho Tire v. Carmi-
chael: A Compass for Problems of Definition and Procedure Created by Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 52 BAYLOR L. REV. 603, 646 n.60 (2000). 
 31 Daubert IV,  43 F.3d at 1315–16. 
 32 As the Court confirmed in Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 138 (1999): 
“A trial judge determining the admissibility of an engineer’s testimony may consider 
one or more of the specific Daubert factors.  The emphasis on the word ‘may’ reflects 
Daubert’s description of the Rule 702 inquiry as ‘a flexible one.’” (quoting Daubert III, 
509 U.S. at 594). 
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basic problem . . . is that we must devise standards for acceptabil-
ity where respected scientists disagree on what’s acceptable.33
Reviewing the Supreme Court’s flexible list of indicia of reliabil-
ity, Judge Kozinski proposes a new “Daubert factor” of his own: 
whether the proffered expert testimony is based on work undertaken 
in the normal course of scientific business, or on work conducted 
specifically for the purposes of litigation.  He stresses the likely flaws 
and failings of litigation-driven science: 
 One very significant fact to be considered is whether the experts 
are proposing to testify about matters growing naturally and di-
rectly out of research they have conducted independent of the 
litigation, or whether they have developed their opinions ex-
pressly for the purpose of testifying.  That an expert testifies for 
money does not necessarily cast doubt on the reliability of his tes-
timony, as few experts appear in court merely as an eleemosynary 
gesture.  But in determining whether proposed expert testimony 
amounts to good science, we may not ignore the fact that a scien-
tist’s normal workplace is the lab or the field, not the courtroom 
or the lawyer’s office.34
Referring to Huber’s Galileo’s Revenge, Judge Kozinski suggests 
that the fact that an expert testifies on the basis of work he has con-
ducted independent of litigation “provides important, objective proof 
that the research comports with the dictates of good science”;35 and 
that the fact that research is litigation-driven is an indication that it 
may not comport with those dictates.  In this context he cites Judge 
Johnson’s ruling in Perry: “the examination of a scientific study by a 
cadre of lawyers is not the same as its examination by others trained 
in the field of science or medicine.”36
Judge Kozinski gives two main reasons why science conducted 
independently of the needs of litigation is more likely to be reliable 
than litigation-driven science: 
[a] [E]xperts whose findings flow from existing research are less 
likely to have been biased toward a particular conclusion by the 
promise of remuneration . . . . 
 33 Daubert IV,  43 F.3d at 1316–17 n.3. 
 34 Id. at 1317 (footnote omitted). 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. at 1318 n.8 (citing Perry v. United States, 755 F.2d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 
1985)).  Now, of course, this stress on the important differences between in-court 
“testing” by cross-examination and testing in the sciences will bring to mind Judge 
Pollak’s comments about fingerprint identification.   United States v. Llera-Plaza, No. 
98-362-10, 2002 WL 27305, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2002). 
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[b] [I]ndependent research carries its own indicia of reliability, as 
it is conducted . . . in the usual course of business and must nor-
mally satisfy a variety of standards to attract funding and institu-
tional support.37
Referring again to Huber’s book, Judge Kozinski suggests that 
proffered scientific testimony that is not based on research inde-
pendent of litigation requires some other indication of reliability;38 
specifically, he suggests, had their work been subjected to peer review 
and publication, this would provide some assurance that the plain-
tiffs’ experts’ research was in accordance with the scientific method, 
as understood by at least a minority of the relevant scientific commu-
nity.  But not only had the plaintiffs’ proffered experts conducted 
their work for the purposes of litigation; not one of them had pub-
lished his Bendectin research in peer-reviewed journals, as they had 
their other scientific work.  Given that their findings would surely be 
of interest to the scientific community, Judge Kozinski continues, the 
fact that they had been unable or unwilling to publish them under-
mines the idea that these results are, as the Daubert standards re-
quired, “grounded in the methods and procedures of science.”39
In a startling but tantalizingly brief footnote to which we shall 
have to return in due course, he adds that “[t]here are, of course, ex-
ceptions”—kinds of litigation-driven science of which, he believes, 
there is no reason to be skeptical.40  Some forensic sciences, such as 
fingerprinting or DNA identification techniques, “have the court-
room as a principal theater of operations”; but here the fact that an 
expert has developed an expertise primarily for purposes of litigation 
“will obviously [sic] not be a substantial consideration.”41 (As we shall 
see later, however, really this is far from obvious.) 
Early in his ruling, Judge Kozinski had observed that “apart from 
a small but determined group of scientists testifying on behalf of the 
Bendectin plaintiffs in this and many other cases, there doesn’t ap-
pear to be a scientist who has concluded that Bendectin causes limb-
reduction defects”;42 under Frye, which had been the law of the circuit 
at the time when the Dauberts’ experts submitted their affidavits, 
their testimony would certainly have to be excluded.  However, given 
 37 Daubert IV, 43 F.3d at 1317. 
 38 Id. at 1316–17. 
 39 Id. at 1318 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. (Daubert III), 509 U.S. 
579, 589–90 (1993)). 
 40 Id. at 1317 n.5. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. at 1314. 
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that the law had changed in the meantime, they might have been 
given an opportunity to submit additional proof that their proffered 
evidence was, as required by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Daubert, 
“derived by the scientific method”—but for the fact, Judge Kozinski 
argues, that it was already clear this wouldn’t change the outcome: 
the Dauberts’ proffered expert testimony would clearly have to be ex-
cluded under the new standards, as it was under the old.43
Surprisingly, however, Judge Kozinski’s reasoning to this conclu-
sion makes little use of the idea that litigation-driven science is espe-
cially suspect.  In fact—despite his mock-modest announcement at 
the outset that he will “take a deep breath and proceed with [the] 
heady task” of assessing the reliability of the proffered science44—it 
leaves scientific issues essentially untouched.  Moreover, it calls on 
the reliability prong of Daubert with respect to only one of the plain-
tiffs’ experts, Dr. Palmer—the only proffered expert who would tes-
tify that Bendectin actually did cause Jason Daubert’s birth defects, 
rather than that it could possibly have caused them; and the fact that 
Dr. Palmer’s research was litigation-driven plays no specific role in 
Judge Kozinski’s argument why it would have to be excluded, which is 
simply that “Dr. Palmer offers no tested or testable theory to explain 
how . . . he was able to eliminate all other potential causes of birth 
defects . . . .”45  The other proffered experts, who would speak in 
terms of probabilities, would have to be excluded under the rele-
vance prong; for none of them even claimed to show, as required, 
that Bendectin more than doubles the risk of such defects.46
* * * 
Like Mrs. Daubert, Mrs Blum took Bendectin for morning-
sickness; like Jason Daubert, Jeffrey Blum was born with severe de-
fects—in his case, clubbed feet; like the Dauberts, the Blums believed 
Bendectin was the cause.  In 1982, seven years before the Dauberts’ 
suit, Jeffrey Blum’s parents brought suit against Merrell Dow; and the 
case slowly wound its way through the Pennsylvania courts for eight-
een years before being finally resolved, years after Daubert, in 2000. 
 43 Daubert IV, 43 F.3d at 1319–20. 
 44 Id. at 1316. 
 45 Id. at 1319. 
 46 Id. at 1320–21 (“California tort law requires that . . . plaintiffs must establish 
not just that their mothers’ ingestion of Bendectin increased somewhat the likeli-
hood of birth defects, but that it more than doubled it. . . .  None of the plaintiffs’ 
epidemiological experts claims that the ingestion of Bendectin during pregnancy 
more than doubles the risk of birth defects.”); see also, Sanders, supra note 22, at 16 
n.63, on this standard for proof of specific causation. 
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The first trial ended in 1988 with a jury verdict for the plain-
tiffs.47  Merrell Dow appealed, on the grounds that the verdict had 
been reached by only eleven jurors (the twelfth had fallen ill part-way 
through the trial); and in 1993 was granted a new trial.48  On remand, 
in 1996 the Court of Common Pleas again entered judgment on jury 
verdict for the plaintiffs (this time with the full complement of ju-
rors).49 Merrell Dow appealed again, this time on the grounds that 
the plaintiffs’ scientific testimony should have been excluded by the 
court; the jury—on the vital importance of which they had earlier in-
sisted—should never have been allowed to hear it.  In 1997, the Su-
perior Court held that plaintiffs’ expert testimony regarding the 
causal link between Bendectin and birth defects was not admissible 
under Frye, and remanded the case “with instructions to the trial 
court to enter” judgment n.o.v. in favor of Merrell Dow.50  In 1999, 
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted allocatur51 to consider 
whether the Frye rule still governed the admissibility of expert scien-
tific testimony in Pennsylvania, or had been superseded by Daubert.  
In 2000, declining to replace Frye by what it took to be52 the more re-
laxed standards of Daubert, but arguing that the Blums’ expert testi-
mony was inadmissible under either standard, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court affirmed the decision of the Superior Court in favor of 
the defendant manufacturer.53
While Merrell Dow had maintained that the plaintiffs’ proffered 
expert scientific testimony should have been excluded because it 
wasn’t generally accepted in the scientific community, the Blums’ at-
 47 Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 1 Pa. D. & C.4th 634, 635 (Ct. Comm. Pleas 
Pa. 1988). 
 48 Blum ex. rel. Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 626 A.2d 537, 549 (Pa. 1993). 
 49 Blum ex rel. Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 33 Phila. Co. Rptr. 193, 243 
(Ct. Comm. Pleas Pa. 1996), rev’d, 705 A.2d 1314 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997), aff’d, 764 
A.2d 1 (Pa. 2000). 
 50 Blum ex. rel. Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 705 A.2d 1314, 1325 (Pa. Su-
per. Ct. 1997), aff’d, 764 A.2d 1 (Pa. 2000). 
 51 10 TIMOTHY P. WILE & MARC A. WERLINSKY, WEST’S PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE 
DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE § 30:53 (2006–07 ed.) (explaining that “[a]nother 
name for allowance of appeal is allocatur”). 
 52 The Supreme Court's rhetoric had described the Frye Rule as an “austere stan-
dard” which the Federal Rules had relaxed.  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. 
Daubert III), 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993).  Other states besides Pennsylvania—Florida, 
for one—also took this rhetoric at face value.  Brim v. State, 695 So. 2d 268, 271–72 
(Fla. 1997) (“[d]espite the federal adoption of a more lenient standard . . . we [Flor-
ida] have maintained the higher standard of reliability as dictated by Frye.”).  In prac-
tice, however, Daubert standards have arguably proven significantly more restrictive 
than the old Frye rule. 
 53 Blum ex rel. Blum, 764 A.2d at 4–5. 
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torneys had argued that Merrell Dow’s expert testimony should have 
been excluded because the supposed “scientific consensus” on this 
matter was completely artificial; it had been created by the defendant 
manufacturer’s support of favorable research and of questionable 
peer-reviewed journals that would publish results helpful to the com-
pany in defending itself against Bendectin litigation.  Dissenting in 
part from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s final disposition of the 
case in favor of Merrell Dow, Justice Castille summed up the issue: 
[I]n the litigation-driven Bendectin “scientific community” de-
scribed to the court in this case, the notion of “general accep-
tance” or scientific “orthodoxy”. . . on the question of causation 
was a questionable proposition to begin with . . . because the trial 
court had heard extensive evidence concerning Merrell Dow’s ac-
tive and deliberate role, motivated by its litigation interests . . ., in 
actually creating and influencing the scientific orthodoxy that 
would then operate to suppress any contrary opinion that might 
harm its Bendectin litigation . . . .54
 Justice Castille refers us to Judge Bernstein’s ruling at the second 
trial.   
 This ruling—the tone of which is, to say the least, unusually im-
passioned—opens with a remarkable excerpt from the testimony of 
James Newberne, Merrell Dow’s Vice-President for Drug Safety: 
Q: Sir, it has been the pattern and practice and custom of the 
Merrell Company, in reporting to the FDA, to pick and choose se-
lective information over the past thirty years, relating to the drug 
Bendectin, correct? 
A: Yes, that’s correct.55
Judge Bernstein first summarizes the testimony of the Blums’ 
expert witnesses (including some who had been unsuccessfully prof-
fered by the Dauberts),56 and then subjects the testimony given by 
Merrell Dow’s experts to devastating scrutiny. 
Plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Gross testified that a review of Merrell 
Dow’s animal testing revealed that there were significant numbers of 
abnormalities, including club limbs, that had not been reported to 
 54 Id. at 7–8 (Castille, J., dissenting).  Justice Castille later returned to the issue, 
citing his own dissenting opinion in Blum in his concurring opinion in Grady v. Frito-
Lay, Inc., 839 A.2d 1038, 1048 (Pa. 2003) (Castille, J., concurring). 
 55 Blum ex rel. Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 33 Phila. Co. Rptr. 193, 194 
(Ct. Comm. Pleas Pa. 1996), rev’d, 705 A.2d 1314 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997), aff’d, 764 
A.2d 1 (Pa. 2000). 
 56 Among the Dauberts’ proffered experts were Dr. Gross, Dr. Newman, and Dr. 
Done.  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc (Daubert IV), 43 F.3d 1311, 1321 (9th 
Cir. 1995). 
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the FDA.57  Dr. Done testified to the chemical similarity of Doxyla-
mine, one of the active ingredients in Bendectin, to other known 
teratogens, to in vitro studies showing its detrimental effect on limb 
bud cells, and to his re-analyses of two epidemiological studies which, 
in his opinion, showed an increased risk of clubfeet in the infants of 
women who took Bendectin in “the first four months of pregnancy.”58  
Dr. Newman testified that Doxylamine “can pass through the placen-
tal barrier” and affect the embryo.59  The testimony given by Dr. Stol-
ley at the previous trial, that “there was three times the risk of mal-
formations” in babies whose mothers “had filled more than one 
prescription for Bendectin,” was read into evidence.60
Most important here, however, is Judge Bernstein’s summary 
and scathing commentary on Merrell Dow’s experts’ testimony: 
Defense expert Dr. Bracken, a professor of epidemiology at Yale, 
testified that his study (based on interviews with 1427 mothers, of 
whom only 122 had taken Bendectin) concluded that Bendectin car-
ried no significant risk of birth defects except for pyloric stenosis; 
however, he acknowledged that it showed there was a more than two-
and-a half times greater risk of birth defects in infants born to women 
who took Bendectin and also smoked.61  On cross-examination, he 
agreed not only that articles that are “less than good” can pass peer 
review, but also that his own published study of Bendectin and birth 
defects was itself less than good.62
Defense expert Dr. Klebanoff, who began his work on Bendectin 
long after the drug was taken off the market, testified that Bendectin 
does not cause birth defects, but acknowledged that his own article 
showed a statistically significant association with congenital cataracts, 
underdevelopment of the lungs, and microcephaly.63 Under cross-
examination, he agreed that Bendectin is positively associated with 
clubbed feet.64
Defense expert Dr. Tyl, a developmental toxicologist, was hired 
by the federal government, again long after Bendectin had been 
withdrawn, to perform animal studies on the drug.65  She testified 
 57 Blum ex. rel. Blum, 33 Phila. Co. Rptr. at 202. 
 58 Id. at 203. 
 59 Id. at 206. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at 207–08. 
 62 Id. at 207. 
 63 Blum ex. rel. Blum, 33 Phila. Co. Rptr. at 208–09. 
 64 Id. at 209. 
 65 Id. at 209–15. 
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that “Bendectin is not a teratogen, but it is a ‘developmental toxi-
cant,’” and that as a result of her work the drug had been placed on 
the “List of Developmental Toxicants” maintained by the U.S. Gov-
ernment.  A developmental toxicant, she explained, is defined as an 
indicator of such defects as reduced “body weight, reduced survival, 
increased number of variations, reduced ossification; . . . and certain 
morphological changes.”66
Defense expert Dr. Shapiro (whose formal training in epidemi-
ology amounted only to eleven credits toward a Master’s degree) was 
head of the Slone Center for Epidemiology at Boston University in a 
period when the unit received over one and a half million dollars in 
research-support funds from Merrell Dow.67  He testified that Ben-
dectin could not cause birth defects.  However, the data on which he 
based his opinion lumped together women who took Bendectin dur-
ing the period when limbs were forming, and those who took the 
drug only after the baby’s limbs had formed.68  He agreed that this 
resulted in an underestimate of the incidence of clubfeet in the 
group exposed to Bendectin, but refused to attribute any significance 
to this.69  If Bendectin did cause birth defects, he explained, his study 
might have underestimated the risk; but since Bendectin does not 
cause birth defects, his study could not have done so.70
Defense expert Dr. Newberne admitted that Merrell Dow had 
engaged in “a consistent pattern of underreporting” of adverse effects 
of Bendectin to the FDA.  He acknowledged that during the period 
when a study by Dr. Smithells supposedly showing the safety of Ben-
dectin had been rejected by the British Medical Journal, The Lancet, and 
the New England Journal of Medicine, and eventually was accepted by 
the much less prestigious journal Teratology, the author was actively 
seeking funds from the company, writing that “[m]uch clearly de-
pends upon the value of this publication to Merrell Dow . . . .  If it 
may save the company large sums of money . . . in the California 
court (which is rather what I thought when we undertook this study), 
they may feel magnanimous.”71  Dr. Newberne also testified that 
 66 Blum ex rel. Blum, 33 Phila. Co. Rptr. at 211 n.54, rev’d, 705 A.2d 1314 (Pa. Su-
per. Ct. 1997), aff’d, 764 A.2d 1 (Pa. 2000). 
 67 Blum ex rel. Blum, 33 Phila. Co. Rptr. at 214 & n.69. 
 68 Id. at 215–17. 
 69 Id. at 217. 
 70 Id. (the record says that Dr. Shapiro was head of the Department of Epidemi-
ology at Boston University, but Dr. Richard Clapp of the Boston University School of 
Public Health tells me this is incorrect). 
 71 Id. at 219. 
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Merrell Dow had supported Dr. Shapiro’s research at Boston Univer-
sity and Dr. Hendricks’s in California out of its legal defense funds.72
Defense expert Dr. Brent, the editor of Teratology, who had been 
retained as an expert by Merrell Dow for eighteen years, testified that 
his only formal education in epidemiology was one course in statis-
tics, but considered himself the world authority in “secular trend 
data”—a scientific field in which, Judge Bernstein adds, there is ap-
parently only one practitioner, Dr. Brent himself.73  Using his edito-
rial prerogative to sidestep peer review, he had published in his own 
journal an article entitled Litigation-Produced Pain, Disease, and Suffer-
ing: An Experience with Congenital Malformation Lawsuits, which con-
cluded, based on his review of deposition and trial transcripts, that 
seventeen out of seventeen plaintiffs lied.74  He also testified that he 
had submitted a draft article entitled Bendectin: The Most Comprehen-
sively Studied Human Non-Teratogen, and the Foremost Tortogen-Litigen to 
Merrell Dow’s attorneys for editing, hoping to publish it in The New 
England Journal of Medicine, the Journal of the American Medical Associa-
tion, or The Lancet.75
Dr. Newberne’s testimony, Judge Bernstein comments, revealed 
“[t]he interaction of ‘scientific studies’ and litigation defense”;76 Dr. 
Brent’s testimony clearly “revealed a sycophantic relationship be-
 72 Id. at 221–22. 
 73 Blum ex rel. Blum, 33 Phila. Co. Rptr. at 224. 
 74 Robert L. Brent, Litigation-Produced Pain, Disease, and Suffering: An Experience 
with Congenital Malformation Lawsuits, 16 TERATOLOGY 1, 5 (1977). 
 75 Blum ex rel. Blum, 33 Phila. Co. Rptr. at 225, rev’d, 705 A.2d 1314 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1997), aff’d, 764 A.2d 1 (Pa. 2000). The article in question appears to be Robert L. 
Brent, Bendectin: Review of the Medical Literature of a Comprehensively Studied Human Non-
teratogen and the Most Prevalent Tortogen-Litigen, 9 REPROD. TOXICOLOGY 337 (1995).  
This paper prompted a lawsuit for defamation by Dr. Stuart A. Newman, whom Dr. 
Brent had misquoted, against Dr. Brent and the editor of Reproductive Toxicology.  At 
the suggestion of the presiding judge, the parties were invited to air their differences 
in a scientific forum.  See Stuart A. Newman, Dr. Brent and Scientific Debate, 13 REPROD. 
TOXICOLOGY 241 (1999) (complaining of the “partisan” nature of Dr. Brent's work, 
which “should have raised questions about the objectivity of the peer review and edi-
torial process,” and noting his association with the law firm of Dinsmore & Shohl, 
which represented Merrell Dow in many of its Bendectin cases); Robert L. Brent, Re-
sponse to Dr. Stuart Newman's Commentary on an Article Entitled “Bendectin: Review of the 
Medical Literature of a Comprehensively Studied Human Nonteratogen and the Most Prevalent 
Tortogen-litigen,” 13 REPROD. TOXICOLOGY 245 (1999) (pointing out that Dr. Newman's 
testimony had been excluded in several Bendectin cases); Stuart A. Newman, A Re-
sponse to Dr. Brent’s Commentary on “Dr. Brent and Scientific Debate,” 13 REPROD. 
TOXICOLOGY 255, 256 (1999) (noting that much of Dr. Brent's response relies on 
judges’ opinions regarding scientific issues); see also Robert L. Brent, Bendectin and 
Birth Defects: Hopefully, the Final Chapter, 67 BIRTH DEFECTS RES. 79 (2003) (urging the 
reintroduction of Bendectin as effective and harmless). 
 76 Blum ex rel. Blum, 33 Phila. Co. Rptr. at 222. 
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tween Dr. Brent and the attorneys representing Merrell Dow.”77 
Moreover, testimony presented “clearly demonstrated that not all 
‘peer review’ journals are created equal,” that “not all the articles 
contained in ‘peer review’ journals were even reviewed,” and that “ar-
ticles were intentionally inserted in peer review journals for use in 
court.”78  But most immediately to the present purpose is Judge Bern-
stein’s exasperated commentary on Dr. Shapiro’s testimony: when 
asked by the court whether his study underestimated the risk of Ben-
dectin, Dr. Shapiro replied, “yes”; but immediately went on to add 
that what he meant was only that, if there were a causal relationship, it 
would have been underestimated, but “[i]f there were no causal rela-
tionship, which is what I believe . . . there could not have been any 
underestimates.”79 “The circularity of this reasoning,” Judge Bern-
stein argues, makes it unmistakably clear that Dr. Shapiro was en-
gaged in “justification science not inquisitive science”; and, he con-
tinues, “[c]learly revealed in this testimony is the unalterable 
preconception from which Dr. Shapiro’s ‘scientific conclusion’ was 
derived.”80  Dr. Shapiro’s conviction that Bendectin is not teratogenic 
was so firm from the outset that he was virtually impervious to any 
evidence that might suggest otherwise. 
* * * 
Is Bendectin teratogenic?  After reading only Daubert, an intelli-
gent, fair-minded layperson would be inclined to say: “almost cer-
tainly not.” After reading Blum, however, he might well say, as I 
would: “I’m not so sure as I was; it’s all very confusing.”  Maybe 
Merrell Dow overstepped ethical boundaries in protecting its inter-
ests in that self-defeating way to which defendant manufacturers seem 
prone,81 but maybe they really had something to hide.  For someone 
 77 Id. at 225 (responding to Dr Brent’s claim that there was “a sycophantic alli-
ance between the expert witness and the plaintiff’s attorney”). 
 78 Id. at 246–47. 
 79 Id. at 217. 
 80 Id. 
 81 I am thinking here, for example, of the instructions to salespeople uncovered 
by Dan Bolton, attorney for Maria Stern in her 1984 case against Dow Corning alleg-
ing injuries caused by her silicone breast-implants.  The incriminating memo reads, 
in part: 
[I]t has been observed that the new mammaries with responsive gel 
have a tendency to appear oily after being manipulated.  This could 
prove to be a problem with your daily detailing activity. . . .  You should 
make plans to change demonstration samples often.  Also, be sure that 
samples are clean and dry before customer detailing. 
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outside the relevant fields, it’s almost impossible to know.82  But for 
someone in my field—epistemology—the tangled tale of Daubert and 
Blum is just the kind of tangle to make the fingers itch. 
III. AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL SWAMP: THE SINKING SANDS OF 
“LITIGATION-DRIVEN” AND “EVIDENTIARY RELIABILITY” 
Though, as Jonathan Rauch once observed, a good way “to clear 
the room at a cocktail party”83 is to use the word “epistemology,” I 
hope that in this more academic forum I may be permitted to observe 
that the law is up to its neck in epistemological concepts and ques-
tions.84  In the present context we need to understand, at a minimum, 
the difference between inquiry and advocacy; the nature of advocacy 
research; the contrast between disinterestedness and bias; and the re-
lation of all these to issues about truth and reliability. 
Inquiry, investigation—the professional business of scientists, 
historians, legal and literary scholars, investigative journalists, and so 
forth—is a matter of trying to discover the answer to some question: 
who committed the crime, what caused the cancer or made it ad-
vance so quickly, where did the money go, etc.?  Advocacy, by con-
trast—the professional business of lobbyists, attorneys, and so on—is 
a matter of trying to persuade an audience of the truth of some 
proposition: that my client didn’t do it, that it was work-related PCB 
exposure that promoted the tumor, that the stolen money has been 
hidden in a numbered account in the Cayman Islands, etc. 
MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND THE LAW IN 
THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE 59 (1996). 
 82 Sanders, supra note 27.  Prof. Sanders’ conclusion is that the weight of the sci-
entific work indicated that Bendectin is probably not teratogenic, but that the evi-
dence presented to juries in Bendectin cases did not accurately represent the true 
state of the science.  Id. at 3.  He acknowledges, however, that some in vivo studies 
have shown teratogenic effects; that six epidemiological studies had found a statisti-
cally significant correlation between Bendectin and certain types of defect; that many 
studies failed to pinpoint the time in pregnancy  during which mothers took Bendec-
tin; and that the presence of the suspect ingredient, Doxylamine Succinate, in two 
over-the-counter drugs—Unisom and Nyquil—that some subjects may have taken 
could have skewed study results.  Id. at 25–26.  Prof. Sanders’s description of some of 
the supposedly reassuring animal-testing work undertaken by Merrell Dow in  
1966–1967, in the wake of the Thalidomide disaster, also leaves one a little uneasy: 
“[a]lthough their test animals suffered several defects, Newberne and Gibson did not 
attribute the defects to Bendectin.”  Id. at 21. 
 83 JONATHAN RAUCH, KINDLY INQUISITORS: THE NEW ATTACKS ON FREE THOUGHT 35 
(1993). 
 84 Susan Haack, Epistemology Legalized: Or, Truth, Justice, and the American Way, 49 
AM. J. JURIS. 43, 44 (2004). 
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Magistrate Judge Breen observes in Nelson that we want expert 
opinions to be “about science, . . . not advocacy.”85  That distinction is 
clear enough; but the most relevant distinction here is between in-
quiry, investigation, real research, i.e., really trying to find the true 
answer to some question, whatever that truth may be, and advocacy 
research, i.e., trying to find the strongest possible evidence for the 
truth of some proposition determined in advance.  This, I take it, was 
the distinction Judge Bernstein had in mind when he contrasted Dr. 
Shapiro’s “justification science” (i.e., advocacy research) with “in-
quisitive science” (i.e., real research, inquiry plain and simple).  
Distinguishing genuine inquiry, the real thing, from pseudo-
inquiry or “sham reasoning,” C.S. Peirce—a working scientist as well 
as the greatest of American philosophers—wrote that “[t]he spirit . . . 
is the most essential thing—the motive”; that genuine inquiry consists 
in “actually drawing the bow upon truth with intentness in the eye, 
with energy in the arm.”86  For the same reason, I am tempted to 
write of advocacy “research” (in scare quotes); for it is something of a 
stretch to call advocacy research “research” at all.  Advocacy “re-
search” is like inquiry insofar as it involves seeking out evidence.  But 
it is part of an advocacy project insofar as it involves seeking out evi-
dence favoring a predetermined conclusion; and it is undertaken in 
the spirit, from the motive, of an advocate.  In short, it is a kind of 
pseudo-inquiry. 
There’s nothing wrong with advocacy, as such.  There’s nothing 
wrong, even, with a scientist taking on the role of advocate—even on 
matters related to his own field; indeed, it might be argued that if a 
medical or environmental scientist, for example, discovers a hitherto 
unsuspected health risk or benefit, he has a moral obligation to bring 
it to the public attention as effectively as possible.  But there is some-
thing wrong with advocacy research.  Investigating the risks and bene-
fits of taking this dietary supplement or damning that river is a quite 
different enterprise from advocating that the supplement be banned 
or that the dam be built; and while it is highly desirable that advocacy 
be based on the results of well-conducted investigation, it is highly 
undesirable that advocacy be allowed to slant investigation. 
Obviously enough, someone straightforwardly investigating a 
question and someone engaged in advocacy research on behalf of a 
 85 Nelson v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., No 95-1112, 1998 WL 1297690, at *9 (W.D. 
Tenn. Aug. 31, 1998). 
 86 CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE 1.34 
(Charles Hartshorne, et. al. eds., 1931–58) (1903); id. 1.235 (1902) (references to 
the COLLECTED PAPERS are by volume and paragraph number).    
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particular answer take different attitudes to the evidence.  The plain-
and-simple inquirer wants to find the answer (though the upshot may 
be a realization that his question was in some way misconceived, and 
when he does find an answer, he will often find himself faced with a 
slew of new questions).  He is motivated to seek out all the evidence 
he can lay hands on, to weigh it as judiciously as possible, to assess 
where it leads as carefully as he can, and to suspend judgment unless 
and until his evidence warrants drawing a conclusion.  An advocacy 
researcher, by contrast, is motivated to seek out all the evidence that 
favors his predetermined conclusion, but to ignore, play down, or 
explain away any evidence contrary to that conclusion. 
So, being motivated to seek out all the evidence, the plain-and-
simple inquirer will be more thorough than the advocacy researcher 
looking only for favorable evidence; being concerned to find the an-
swer whatever the answer may be, he will be less partial than the advo-
cacy researcher trying to minimize the importance of unfavorable 
evidence he can neither ignore nor explain away; and, being ready to 
acknowledge evidence either way, he will be more honest than the ad-
vocacy researcher trying to disguise what doesn’t suit his purpose.  
This is why he is likelier than an advocacy researcher—other things 
(his ability, energy, resources, etc.) being equal—to discover the 
truth; the more so, the longer he inquires.   
Connections with the concepts of interestedness and bias now 
begin to come into focus.  In one sense, to describe an inquirer as 
“interested” means that he takes an interest in the question he is in-
vestigating (he isn’t bored by it or uninterested in it, nor is he just du-
tifully but unenthusiastically doing what is required by his job or de-
manded by his Ph.D. supervisor).  In another and potentially more 
problematic sense, it means that he has an interest in the answer to 
the question coming out this way rather than that, i.e., he stands to 
gain in some way from reaching this conclusion rather than a differ-
ent one.  And in a third sense, the most problematic, an interested 
investigator is really only an “investigator”; for the way he proceeds is 
distorted by his desire that the answer come out in the way by which 
he stands to gain.  Often, but not always or inevitably, someone who is 
interested in the second sense is also interested in the third.  It is the 
third sense that chiefly concerns us here; for an “inquirer” who is in-
terested in this sense is bound to be biased: that is, to lean in one di-
rection, to play up the evidence on one side of his question and play 
down anything negative.  (This reveals the connection between the 
two senses of “partial”: an investigator who is partial, in the sense of  
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“biased toward one side of an issue,” will concentrate selectively on 
evidence which is partial, in the sense of “incomplete.”) 
Peirce’s prime example of sham reasoning was the “seminary 
philosophy” dominant in his day.  Theologians, he argued, being pro-
fessionally committed to the truth of certain propositions, are profes-
sionally obliged to adjust their philosophical arguments so as to pre-
serve and support those propositions.87  So perhaps it is no wonder 
that a prime contemporary example that comes to my mind is the 
“research” offered by its proponents in favor of Intelligent Design 
Theory.  So far as I can see, this amounts only to efforts, often 
botched, and sometimes apparently outright dishonest,88 to identify 
“gaps and problems” in the theory of evolution, and to cover up the 
much more formidable gaps and problems in Intelligent Design 
Theory.89  Judge Jones’s unremittingly commonsense analysis in Kitz-
miller—noting that even some of the expert witnesses for the defen-
dant school district acknowledge that there is no real scientific re-
search supporting Intelligent Design Theory—does a pretty good job 
of unmasking this sham reasoning.90
Of course, the real world is always much messier than philoso-
phers would like.  Rather than a simple division into genuine and 
pseudo-inquiry, honest and dishonest inquirers, we find more and 
less plain-and-simple investigation, and just about every degree and 
shade of intellectual honesty and dishonesty.91  The categorical dis-
 87 Id. at 1.620 (1898). 
 88 For example, the Intelligent Design biology text, PERCIVAL DAVIS & DEAN 
KENYON, OF PANDAS AND PEOPLE 104 (3d ed. 1993), stresses the absence of transitional 
fossils of creatures between fishes and amphibians, and the large differences between 
the two.  But when in 2006 scientists discovered the fossil remains of the 375 million-
year-old crocodile-headed giant fish, the tiktaalik, which appears to have been pre-
cisely such a transitional creature, a spokesperson for the Discovery Institute, which 
has been aggressively promoting Intelligent Design Theory, professed unconcern: 
“few leading [Intelligent Design] researchers have argued against the existence of 
transitional forms.”  John Noble Wilford, Fossil Called Missing Link from Sea to Land 
Animals, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2006, at A1; If It Walks Like a Fish . . . , NEWSWEEK, Apr. 27, 
2007, at 8. 
 89 See SUSAN HAACK, DEFENDING SCIENCE—WITHIN REASON: BETWEEN SCIENTISM AND 
CYNICISM, at X–XIII, 272–82 (paperback ed. 2007); Susan Haack, Fallibilism and Faith, 
Naturalism and the Supernatural, Science and Religion, in PUTTING PHILOSOPHY TO WORK: 
INQUIRY AND ITS PLACE IN CULTURE 183 (2008). 
 90 Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005); see also 
EDWARD HUMES, MONKEY GIRL: EVOLUTION, EDUCATION, AND THE BATTLE FOR 
AMERICA’S SOUL (2007) (telling the story of the Kitzmiller trial, including Eric Roths-
child’s devastating cross-examination of Michael Behe, expert witness for the defen-
dant school district). 
 91 In Arthur Hailey’s novel, Strong Medicine (1984)—clearly based on the Bendec-
tin saga, but telling the story of a fictional drug company, Felding-Roth, and its fic-
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tinction between genuine inquiry and advocacy research with which I 
have been working thus far, while agreeably neat and tidy conceptu-
ally, isn’t adequate to the complexities of real life; it needs to be re-
construed as identifying the two extremes of a continuum.  No inves-
tigator can approach his question free of any preconceptions 
whatever; most investigators have some preconception of the ex-
pected upshot from the beginning—though those who really want 
the truth will change their minds should the evidence demand it; and 
even the most honest and single-minded investigator is vulnerable to 
that very natural tendency to duck, resist, or conveniently forget evi-
dence that pulls against the view he has previously defended in print, 
or against his fond hope that this, finally, will be the key to finding a 
vaccine, and so on.92  Figuring things out can be really hard, and the 
temptation to cut corners is ever-present. 
So Intelligent Design “research” is only one example among 
many, for the sad fact is that inquiry that is not quite plain-and-
simple, less than perfectly honest, tainted, if not by outright dishon-
esty, by convenient self-deception, is ubiquitous.  We are all only too 
familiar with the phenomenon of the “Public Inquiry” the purpose of 
which is to reassure the public that there is no real danger, or that 
the corruption is all the fault of one junior official; with the “Cus-
tomer Survey” the purpose of which is to fish for favorable material 
the publicity department can use; with the “departmental review” the 
purpose of which is to get friends from outside to endorse the fac-
ulty’s grandiose hopes for expansion.  We are all aware, also, that in 
many disciplines—economics, public health, the environmental sci-
ences, to mention just a few—the pressures to nudge inquiry in the 
direction of advocacy are subtle, and the boundary easily trans-
gressed.  And we all know that, even in the disciplines furthest re-
moved from policy or practice, academics often succumb to the 
temptation to divert energy from finding out what they can, or from 
tional morning-sickness drug, Montayne—one fictional scientist, Martin Peat-Smith, 
is a paradigm of the honest inquirer, and another, Vincent Lord, of the self-deceived 
advocacy researcher.  See also Susan Haack, The Ideal of Intellectual Integrity, in Life and 
Literature, 36 NEW LITERARY HIST., 359 (2005), reprinted in Haack, supra note 89, at 
195–208. 
 92 Sinclair Lewis's novel, Arrowsmith (1924), conveys the point: Martin Arrowsmith 
destroys the integrity of his test of a vaccine by giving it, out of sympathy with their 
suffering and hope of curing them, to all those who have been exposed. John Berry's 
historical study, The Great Influenza (2004), illustrates it: scientists desperate to find a 
vaccine ignored evidence that influenza is not bacterial; only Oswald Avery patiently 
held out. Dr. Brent, whom we encountered in Blum, seems to have been motivated in 
part by the fear that, with Bendectin off the market, physicians would have no effec-
tive treatment for a potentially serious condition. 
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seriously thinking things through, into efforts to promote their area, 
their line, or their clique. 
There are many kinds of advocacy research, and many sources of 
bias: some advocacy researchers are too concerned to arrive at a re-
sult favorable to a sponsor; some are over-anxious to find a cure 
quickly; some are too protective of a pet approach or theory, or too 
deferential to an idea endorsed by a hero of their profession; some 
get careless out of concern over global warming or pollution, or etc.; 
some want to reach politically-correct conclusions potentially benefi-
cial to their careers, or to avoid reaching politically-incorrect conclu-
sions potentially damaging to their careers; and many are simply too 
certain they are right—and so feel entirely justified in suppressing 
apparently unfavorable evidence which, as they see it, can only be 
misleading.93
* * * 
To describe research as “litigation-driven” may mean either (a) 
that the need for this work arises out of litigation, or (b) that the 
work is undertaken for the purpose of finding evidence favoring one 
side in litigation, and explaining away or otherwise playing down evi-
dence favoring the other side.  Research which is litigation-driven in 
sense (a) may, but need not, also be litigation-driven in sense (b).  
Research which is litigation-driven in the first sense is not peculiarly 
susceptible to bias merely by virtue of being, in this sense, litigation-
driven.  But research which is litigation-driven in the second sense is 
(one kind of) advocacy research; and so, if my analysis is correct, is 
inherently in danger of bias. 
This danger is mitigated somewhat if advocacy research rests on 
science which has non-judicial as well as judicial uses, but it is not 
completely averted.  Think of DNA identifications: the underlying 
 93 William McBride, the Australian physician who first drew attention to the tera-
togenic effects of Thalidomide, was apparently so distressed at the delay before his 
warnings about Thalidomide were heeded that when, subsequently, he began to sus-
pect Bendectin (sold in Australia under the name "Debendox") of causing birth de-
fects, he resorted to fraud in his study of pregnant rabbits given the related anti-
cholinergic Scopolamine. Before the fraud was revealed, Dr. McBride had testified 
for the plaintiffs in seventeen Bendectin cases.  Sanders, supra note 23, at 36.  See A. 
Skolnick, Key Witness Against Morning Sickness Drug Faces Scientific Fraud Charges, 263 J. 
AM. MED. ASS’N 1468 (1990); G.F. Humphrey, Scientific Fraud: The McBride Case, 32 
MED. SCI. L. 199 (1992); G.F. Humphrey, Scientific Fraud: The McBride Case—Judgment, 
34 MED. SCI. L. 299 (1994).  Scopolamine is now marketed in the form of a patch as 
an anti-nausea drug, under the name “Transderm Scop.”  RXList.com, Clinical 
Pharmacology, http://www.rxlist.com/cgi/generic2/transscop_cp.htm (last visited 
Feb. 20, 2006). 
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theoretical principles are deeply interconnected with a whole range 
of other areas of well-established science, and these techniques are 
used, for example, to identify disaster victims as well as to identify the 
perpetrators of crimes.  The theory is about as solid as scientific the-
ory gets.  But it’s not the underlying principles that are disputed at 
trial; courts are not (by now, anyway) trying to determine whether 
these principles are sound, but whether they have been reliably ap-
plied in this instance.  There is plenty of room for bias to creep into 
the application of even the soundest science. 
 Research may be prompted by the needs of a particular case, 
or class of cases; or it may be prompted, not by cases already ongoing, 
but by the fear that there will, or may, be litigation.  Moreover, there 
is very often more than one motive for conducting research, which 
may, for example, be intended to make the case for FDA approval, to 
be useful for marketing purposes, and to provide protection against 
possible litigation.  Obviously enough, besides the hope of prevailing 
in litigation, some of these other motives—the marketing-oriented, 
for example—are also likely to introduce bias. 
Since Daubert gives this concept a crucial role, we also need to 
give some thought to what it means to describe scientific testimony as 
“reliable.”  Merriam-Webster’s definition is: “suitable or fit to be relied 
on[;] . . . giving the same results in successive trials”;94 the Oxford Eng-
lish Dictionary’s is: “may be relied upon, of sound & consistent charac-
ter or quality.”95 Unless it is intended to be read disjunctively, Web-
ster’s definition seems a little odd, for the second clause seems to 
allow that a procedure or technique may be reliable even though it 
usually gives false results, provided it does so consistently—which 
hardly seems compatible with fitness to be relied on.  (A weighing 
machine that consistently takes fifty pounds off a person’s real 
weight, or a clock that runs perfectly but was set to the wrong time to 
begin with, are not, in the ordinary sense of the term, reliable; 
though I suppose you might describe them as, though “off,” at least 
reliably off.) The Oxford English Dictionary’s definition, by virtue of its 
reference to the “soundness” of the results, is closer to my under-
standing of the word. 
Not unexpectedly, however, the legal concept of reliability ar-
ticulated in Daubert diverges somewhat from the ordinary sense; as 
Justice Blackmun’s phrase “evidentiary reliability” signals, it is a spe-
 94 MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1051 (11th ed. 2003). 
 95 THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH 1028 (4th ed. 1959). 
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cialized legal concept.  It is also far from transparent.  Justice Black-
mun writes: 
     We note that scientists typically distinguish between “validity” 
(does the principle support what it purports to show?) and “reli-
ability” (does application of the principle produce consistent re-
sults?).  Although “the difference between accuracy, validity, and 
reliability may be such that each is distinct from the other by no 
more than a hen’s kick,” our reference here is to evidentiary reli-
ability—that is, trustworthiness.  In a case involving scientific evi-
dence, evidentiary reliability will be based upon scientific validity.96
This tells us that the legal or “evidentiary” concept of reliability is 
to be tied to scientific “validity,” not to scientific “reliability”; which 
seems to mean, in part, that yielding consistent results (which is Jus-
tice Blackmun’s understanding of “scientific reliability”) is not 
enough.  The reference to “trustworthiness” points in the same direc-
tion: “evidentiary reliability” requires scientific testimony to be based 
on methods and processes that yield “sound,” and not merely consis-
tent, results.  But Justice Blackmun’s understanding of “sound” is ap-
parently quite modest; it does not require that the principle on which 
expert testimony is based yield true or even probably true results, but 
only that “the principle support[s] what it purports to show.”97   
The fact that research is litigation-driven in the stronger sense, I 
have argued, makes it likely to be biased.  Biased research doesn’t 
necessarily produce false results; nor does it necessarily produce false 
results more often than true.  After all, the proposition(s) toward 
which it is slanted may be true; and when there is biased research on 
both sides of a legal case, if the propositions on each side genuinely 
contradict each other, the proposition(s) toward which one side’s re-
search is slanted must be true.  But biased research tends toward the 
predetermined conclusion irrespective of where the evidence points; 
the results it produces don’t depend on where the evidence really 
leads.  So if this is, as it seems to be, a reasonable interpretation of the 
Daubert Court’s “evidentiary reliability,” then, indeed, biased research 
is unreliable in the relevant sense. 
 96 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. (Daubert III), 509 U.S. 579, 590 n.9 
(1993) (citations omitted).  The internal quotation is from James Starrs, Frye v. 
United States Restructured and Revitalized: A Proposal to Amend Federal Rule of Evidence 
703, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 249, 256 (1986). 
 97 Daubert III, 509 U.S. at 590 n.9. 
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IV. THROUGH THE THICKET, OUT OF THE  
SWAMP, AND ONTO THE HIGH ROAD? NOT YET! 
So there is some foundation for Judge Bernstein’s strictures 
against “justification science”; indeed, his observation that Dr. 
Shapiro’s work seems to have been based on an “unalterable precon-
ception” that Bendectin was harmless closely parallels the argument 
here, that science that is litigation-driven in the stronger sense fails to 
meet Justice Blackmun’s standard of evidentiary reliability because 
the conclusions drawn are not sensitive to the evidence in the way 
they ought to be.  And, again provided that  “litigation-driven” is un-
derstood in the stronger sense, there is some foundation, also, for 
Judge Kozinski’s conclusion that the fact that testimony is based on 
litigation-driven research speaks negatively to its (evidentiary) reli-
ability. 
However, there is something amiss with Judge Kozinski’s argu-
ments for that conclusion.  His first argument, remember, is that sci-
ence flowing from existing research is less likely to be biased toward a 
particular conclusion by the promise of remuneration; this is true, 
but it proves much more than he intends.  Many studies confirm that 
company-sponsored research into drugs or medical devices is signifi-
cantly more likely than independent research to be favorable to the 
sponsor’s product;98 but this suggests, not just that litigation-driven 
science may be below par, but also that marketing-oriented science 
should also be regarded with suspicion. 
Moreover, this first argument also undermines the exception 
Judge Kozinski makes with regard to evidence from the forensic sci-
ences.  It is true, as he says, that the fact that forensic scientists ac-
quire their expertise for the purposes of the justice system isn’t in it-
self grounds for doubting the reliability of their testimony; but this is 
not enough to establish his point.  Perhaps the thought implicit here 
is that forensic science is litigation-driven only in the weaker, less 
troubling sense: that while it is needed only because there are crimes 
to be solved and prosecuted, it is not inherently motivated by the de-
sire to make one side of a case; but this is Pollyannish to say the least.  
After all, such work is undertaken almost exclusively for the police or 
 98 See e.g., Richard A. Davidson, Source of Funding and Outcome of Clinical Trials, 1 
J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 155 (1986); Paula Rochon et al., A Study of Manufacturer-
Supported Trials of Non-Steroidal Anti-Inflammatory Drugs in the Treatment of Arthritis, 154 
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 157 (1994); Lee S. Friedman & Elihu D. Richter, Relationship 
Between Conflict of Interest and Research Results, 19 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 51 (2004). 
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prosecution;99 and it seems likely that forensic scientists’ and techni-
cians’ understandable but inappropriate desire to be helpful, to find 
something to make a case against a suspect, sometimes biases their 
judgment.  Or perhaps the thought is that forensic experts will curb 
their biases because they know they will be called on to testify on nu-
merous other occasions;100 but this seems no less doubtful.  After all, 
the fact that expert witnesses in tort cases are “repeat testifiers” or 
“professional expert witnesses,” as we say pejoratively, is often seen, 
not without reason, as grounds for distrusting them.101  Judge Bern-
stein’s worry that “general acceptance in the field to which it be-
longs”102 is a poor indicator of reliability if the consensus is an artifi-
cial one is also relevant here; for in some areas of forensic science 
there is a real danger that a supposed “scientific consensus” has been 
 99 See e.g. William C. Thompson, A Sociological Perspective on the Science of Forensic 
DNA Testing, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1113, 1114 (1997).  
The primary clients of the vast majority of forensic scientists are law en-
forcement agencies.  Most forensic scientists are employed directly by 
law enforcement agencies.  Their role in litigation is typically, and of-
ten exclusively, to provide evidence in support of criminal prosecu-
tions.  Forensic scientists who work in private laboratories may occa-
sionally be employed by criminal defense lawyers.  However, the bulk 
of their work is for law enforcement as well.  The major market for 
commercial laboratories that develop new technology for forensic test-
ing also consists of law enforcement personnel. 
Id. 
 100 Dr. Thompson (the author of the article in note 99, supra) tells me that this is 
the reason Judge Kozinski gave him. 
 101 In the first Blum trial, the court prevented the plaintiff’s attorneys from refer-
ring to the fact that Merrell Dow’s experts had testified in other Bendectin trials. 
Appendix 6, Order and Opinion of Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, May 12, 
1988, at 28 (D’Alessandro, J.) (on file with author).  Judge Kozinski himself suggests 
that the fact that the Dauberts’ proffered experts have been testifying in Bendectin 
cases all over the country is reason to be suspicious of them. Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharms., Inc. (Daubert IV), 43 F. 3d 1311, 1314 (9th Cir. 1995).  In fact, there were 
numerous repeat testifiers on both sides throughout the Bendectin litigation.  Sand-
ers, supra note 45, at 36.  Cf. Chaulk v. Volkswagen of Am. Inc., 808 F.2d 639, 644 
(7th Cir. 1986) (Posner J., dissenting) (writing that an expert’s testimony was either 
the work of 
a crank, or, what is more likely, of a man who is making a career out of 
testifying for plaintiffs in automobile accident cases in which a door 
may have opened; at the time of trial he was involved in 10 such cases. 
His testimony illustrates the age-old problem of expert witnesses who 
are “often the mere paid advocates or partisans of those who employ or 
pay them.” 
(quoting Keegan v. Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R., 78 N.W. 965, 966 (Minn. 1899)). 
 102 Blum ex rel. Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 33 Phila. Co. Rptr. 193, 256 
(Ct. Comm. Pleas Pa. 1996). 
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generated by a kind of guild or trade union of mutually supportive 
practitioners with an interest in protecting their livelihoods.103
Judge Kozinski’s second argument, that litigation-driven science 
is not, like university science, kept up to the mark by the need to at-
tract funding and institutional support, rests on a false premise.  For 
by now a significant proportion of the medical research in universi-
ties is not truly independent, but is sponsored by drug companies and 
such104 (and a significant proportion of research in the social sciences 
is in one way or another politically motivated).  And in combination 
with the first argument, this suggests that there may be reason to 
doubt the reliability of such university science, as well as science spe-
cifically undertaken to support one side or another in litigation, or to 
provide data that can be used in marketing. 
Moreover, the peer-review process for funding and publication, 
on which Judge Kozinski puts quite a lot of weight, is a frail safeguard 
at best.  Even if all the work published in peer-review journals were 
peer-reviewed—which it isn’t—this would be only very weak assur-
ance of its reliability.  As the Daubert Court’s comments on “peer-
review and publication” obliquely acknowledge, it is not peer-
reviewed publication as such that indicates reliability, but the long-
run survival of published results on which other scientists find they 
can build successfully.105
Still, given that, as I have argued, there is merit in the idea that 
the fact that science is litigation-driven in the stronger sense indicates 
that it is likely to be unreliable, in something like the sense Justice 
Blackmun explained in Daubert, might this not be a helpful factor to 
be added to his list of indicia of (un)reliability?  Unfortunately, mat-
ters are not so simple; for the sad fact—obvious once you think about 
it—is that there can be no simple, mechanically applicable test that 
would accurately discriminate strong science from weak.  The Daubert 
Court observes that its list of indicia of reliability is “flexible,” and 
can’t simply be applied mechanically.  And a mechanical application 
of Judge Kozinski’s new Daubert factor would certainly be as ill-advised 
 103 See e.g., D. Michael Risinger, Mark P. Denbeaux & Michael J. Saks, Brave New 
“Post-Daubert World”—A Reply to Professor Moenssens, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 405  
(1998).  The knife-mark examiners in Ramirez v. State, 542 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1989), 
Ramirez v. State, 651 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 1995), and Ramirez v. State, 810 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 
2001) illustrate the problem. 
 104 See e.g., SHELDON KRIMSKY, SCIENCE IN THE PRIVATE INTEREST(2003); Marcia An-
gell, Is Scientific Medicine for Sale?, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1516 (2000). 
 105 Brief for Chubin et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (No. 92-102).  See also Susan Haack, 
Peer Review and Publication: Lessons for Lawyers, 36 STETSON L. REV. 789 (2007). 
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as a mechanical application of a requirement that testimony be based 
on research that has been published in peer-reviewed journals—and 
for structurally similar reasons: “peer-reviewed” and “litigation-
driven” both have (a) a readily-applicable sense that has little to do 
with reliability, and (b) a subtler sense which bears more closely on 
reliability but isn’t readily applicable.  “Published after peer review” is 
easily applied, but it is a frail indicator of reliability; “has been out 
there long enough, has been read by enough others knowledgeable 
enough in the field, links up in an explanatory way with enough 
other bits of scientific theorizing, and has proven robust enough 
when new experiments or theoretical work assume its reliability” is a 
much better indicator of reliability, but it is much more difficult to 
apply.106  Similarly, “undertaken in the course of or in anticipation of 
litigation” is easily applied, but a frail indicator of reliability; “skewed 
by the desire to advance one side in litigation” indicates unreliability, 
all right, but is much more difficult to apply.  
* * * 
I haven’t forgotten that the epistemological rationale for the ad-
versarial system is that having rival advocates each present the evi-
dence favoring their side of a case is a good way to ensure, so far as 
possible, that the truth comes out.  As I have argued elsewhere, the 
best argument that could be made for the epistemological efficacy of 
such a system would run something like this: 
Since for good reasons the legal process, unlike the process of 
scientific inquiry, has to be concluded within a relatively short 
time frame, we need a way of ensuring that the search for and 
scrutiny of evidence is as thorough as that time frame allows.  An 
adversarial system is one way to do this.  If everyone involved 
knows that eventually, at the trial stage, the determination will be 
made by an impartial jury weighing the evidence developed and 
presented by the parties, each subject to cross-examination by the 
other, this should encourage precisely the kind of thoroughness 
we are aiming to achieve.  For an advocate’s goal is to win; so 
counsel for each party is motivated to seek out evidence favoring 
his side of the case, and to bring out the flaws in evidence point-
ing the other way.  To be sure, the process isn’t perfect; but it is a 
reasonable substitute for the ideal.107   
 106 See Haack, supra note 105. 
 107 Haack, supra note 84, at 51. 
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This is a good argument—in principle; however, it is a  serious 
question how well it applies to our adversarial system, as that func-
tions in practice. 
A quite general problem is that there is often a vast asymmetry 
between the resources available to one side in litigation and those 
available to the other.  And where scientific testimony is concerned 
there are further problems as well.  In 1901, Judge Learned Hand 
complained that the expert-witness system “set[s] juries to decide, 
where doctors disagree”;108 more than a century later, Justice 
Rehnquist and Judge Kozinski complain, in effect, that now it “set[s] 
judges to decide, where doctors disagree.”109  The fact is that judges, 
jurors, or attorneys, however conscientious and thorough, probably 
don’t fully understand scientific testimony; to make matters worse, 
the more an area of science gets entangled with litigation, the more 
scientists in that area seem (like Dr. Brent and Dr. Newman) to fall 
into advocacy mode.  And this makes the difficult business of getting 
at the truth of the questions at issue even harder than it would other-
wise be—which is presumably what Justice Castille had in mind when 
he expressed concern about “the litigation-driven Bendectin ‘scien-
tific community’ described to the court” in Blum .110
In the criminal justice system, besides a troubling asymmetry be-
tween the scientific resources ordinarily available to the defense and 
those available to the prosecution, there seem to be grounds for con-
cern both that, in some areas of forensic science, a self-serving guild 
mentality may predominate over the scientific attitude, and that 
courts are reluctant to reconsider their long-standing reliance on 
identification techniques such as fingerprinting (about the reliability 
of which much is claimed, but little seems to be known)111 or psychi-
 108 Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 
15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 54 (1901). 
 109 “I do not doubt that Rule 702 confides to the judge some gatekeeping respon-
sibility in deciding questions of the admissibility of proffered expert testimony. But I 
do not think it imposes on them either the obligation or the authority to become 
amateur scientists in order to perform that role.”  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 
Inc. (Daubert III), 509 U.S. 579, 600–01 (1993) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). “[W]e are 
largely untrained in science and certainly no match for any of the witnesses whose 
testimony we are reviewing.”  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. (Daubert IV), 43 
F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 110 Blum ex rel. Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 764 A.2d 1, 13–14 (Pa. 2000). 
 111 See, e.g., Simon Cole, What Counts for Identity? The Historical Origins of the Method-
ology of Latent Fingerprint Identification, 12 SCI. CONTEXT 139 (1999); Robert Epstein, 
Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint “Science” is Revealed, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 
605 (2002); Jennifer Mnookin, Fingerprints: Not a Gold Standard, ISSUES SCI. & TECH., 
Fall 2003, at 47; Simon Cole, Grandfathering Evidence: Fingerprint Admissibility from 
Jennings to Llera Plaza and Back Again, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1189 (2004); Sharon Be-
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atric techniques such as predictions of future dangerousness.112  And 
in the civil arena, toxic-tort and product-liability litigation seems like 
a kind of lottery, where it is hard to feel confident either that all and 
only those plaintiffs who really were injured by defendants’ products 
are compensated, or that the system provides effective incentives to 
manufacturers to investigate their products as thoroughly as possible. 
In any case, while compensating the victims of dangerous prod-
ucts after the damage has been done, insofar as such compensation is 
possible, is better than nothing, it is hardly the ideal.  It would be bet-
ter, surely, to ensure so far as humanly possible that safe and benefi-
cial drugs, devices, chemicals, etc., are available, but dangerous or 
damaging drugs, etc., are kept off the market, or taken off the market 
as soon as the dangers are known, and that manufacturers are dis-
couraged from hiding or disguising risks posed by their products.  
Policy proposals are not exactly a philosopher’s forte, but I will ven-
ture to ask some of the tough questions that the story of Daubert and 
Blum prompts in my mind.  Do we rely too much on what Justice 
Breyer describes as “the powerful engine of tort litigation,”113 ideally 
the last resort?  Are other technologically advanced countries where 
the engine of tort litigation is less powerful, invariably less successful, 
also, in keeping beneficial products on, and dangerous products off 
the market?  Are other countries’ regulatory agencies more effective, 
and if so, why?  Might some of the energy now devoted to discussions 
of how best to fine-tune the rules of admissibility of expert testimony 
be more profitably diverted to thinking about other and possibly bet-
ter ways to approximate the ideal more closely?  And (perhaps you 
will think this a naïve question, but I’ll ask it anyway): what if the 
time, energy, intelligence, and resources spent on cases like Daubert 
and Blum had been spent instead on independent, honest, solid sci-
entific investigation of the factual issues? 
gley, Despite Its Reputation, Fingerprint Evidence Isn’t Really Infallible, WALL ST. J., June 4, 
2004, at B1. 
 112 See, e.g., Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-Hill, Genetic Predictions of Future 
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(2004). 
 113 Justice Breyer writes that courts’ gatekeeping can help ensure that “the power-
ful engine of tort liability, which can generate strong financial incentives to reduce, 
or eliminate production, points towards the right substances and does not destroy 
the wrong ones.”  G.E. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 148–49 (1997) (Breyer, J., concur-
ring).  Of course, it spoils the effect somewhat that the substance in question in the 
case was PCBs (polychlorinated biphenals), so dangerous that they have been 
banned since 1978! 
